For this reason, mechanisms operating at phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and cultural scales weed out such false beliefs. Human beings with false beliefs about how to secure food, social partners, and physical security do not succeed at these tasks as well as human beings with true beliefs about them. Typically, action-relevant, false beliefs do not persist. Nevertheless, I deny that co-cognition equates to simulation proper or that it plays anything more than a supporting role in understanding reasons for action. For example, I claim it rests in part on a capacity for co-cognition, inter alia, since that ability is necessary for understanding another’s thoughts. In the concluding postscript, I acknowledge that we need more than the folk psychological framework to understand how we understand reasons, but I deny that this something more takes the form of a theory about propositional attitudes or simulative procedures for manipulating them. This should expose the impotence of the standard reasons for believing that folk psychology must be a kind of theory. I then go on to demonstrate how the NPH can account for (i) the structural features of folk psychology and (ii) its staged acquisition without buying into the idea that it is a theory, or that it is acquired by means of constructing one. To add appropriate force to this observation, I first say something about why we should reject the widely held assumption that the primary business of folk psychology is to provide third-personal predictions and explanations. My purpose in this paper is merely to spell out just how the Narrative Practice Hypothesis, if true, undercuts any need to appeal to either theory or simulation when it comes to explaining the basis of folk psychological understanding: these heuristics do not come into play other than in cases of in which the framework is used to speculate about why another may have acted. The chapter discusses these issues, sets out the conditions for explicit control, and outlines some predictions of the proposed account. If we are systematically biased, how can we even form unbiased beliefs, and if we can form them, how can we make them effective? The dual-level view has implications for these questions, assigning a crucial role to metacognitive attitudes of certain kinds. The chapter then turns to the question of how we can overcome implicit bias. This suggests a layered picture of the human mind, with a passive implicit level supporting an active explicit one, and this dual-level view is fleshed out and compared briefly with other theories of mental duality. It then considers the relation between implicit bias and explicit belief, addressing a sceptical worry about the very existence of explicit belief and proposing an account of explicit belief as a form of commitment. It begins by locating implicit bias within a pattern of everyday talk about implicit mentality and arguing that systematic implicit bias is best thought of as an implicit form of belief. This chapter sketches a theoretical framework for thinking about implicit bias and how we can control it.
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